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Abstract 
Cross-border regions are multi-actor and multi-level spaces. Without any formal competencies they are exclusively based on co-
operation between widely self-organized systems (regions). Thus, cross-border governance is facing multiple governance 
dilemmas. In this respect imperative environmental problems have often served as unifying element, putting diverging forces into 
the back. But just as often these issues fell from the agenda when the most important problems seemed to be solved - as they are 
too likely to cause severe conflicts between the partners. The paper discusses the significance of cross-border governance for 
environmental issues in Europe, mainly based on empirical data from the cross-border region of Lake Constance. 
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1. Introduction and Research Questions 
Environmental problems do not stop at national borders. Hence environmental issues have always ranked among 
the most important driving forces for the inflationary rise of cross-border co-operations during the last decades, not 
only but also in Europe. Such co-operative entities bridge territories. They are built of at least two but most of the 
time of significantly more regions belonging to different national states, therefore to different institutional systems. 
These regions do not always coincide with traditional political-administrative boundaries and weigh functional 
demarcation criteria higher than administrative or political ones. And even if cross-border co-operations in Europe 
show enormous differences in scale from euregional co-operations between directly neighboring areas or 
transbordering city-regions on the one hand to big co-operations in a more transnational way on the other hand, their 
strategies look alike. They mainly focus on mastering similar challenges or cross-border problems, on taking 
benefits from complementary assets, on coordination or coalition-building as well as on using synergies and critical 
masses to improve competitive advantages.  
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Cross-border regions are even more multi-actor and multi-level spaces than institutionalized regions in 
decentralized states. Without any formal competencies, cross-border regions are fully depending on successful 
governance-processes to co-ordinate and develop common activities. Their activities are exclusively based on co-
operation between widely self-organized systems (regions). Thus, however, cross-border governance is also facing 
multiple governance dilemmas. Common challenges are further aggravated by differing institutional and legal 
systems resulting in conflicting allocations of competencies on diverging administrative levels, by varying cultural 
backgrounds, by different languages or lacking knowledge about the different systems. In this respect imperative 
environmental problems have often served as unifying element, bringing diverging forces to the background. But 
just as often environmental issues were neglected when the most important problems seemed to be solved or eased, 
as environmental issues are too likely to cause severe conflicts between the partners. Furthermore cross-border 
environmental coalitions are often bypassed via coalitions at the national level or have difficulties in establishing 
effective trans-boundary institutions capable of providing democratic voice to their inhabitants vis-à-vis higher 
levels of decision-making powers. 
However, environmental topics may remain an issue of cross-border governance when spatial development 
questions in general are covered. This means that environmental issues are no longer subject to specific cross-border 
coalitions but are incorporated in multifunctional approaches of cross-border governance. With this respect the 
paper intends to shed light on the significance of cross-border governance for environmental issues (also as integral 
part of cooperative spatial development). What are the main challenges of cross-border governance processes for 
spatial development, what are their limits and shortcomings? And which role does the environment play in these 
approaches? Which kind of environmental issues are included, and how are topics dealt with, which are likely to 
cause unilateral losers? The answers to these questions will particularly be based on empirical data from the cross-
border region of the lake Constance, showing a long tradition and a broad variety of cross-border governance in the 
field of environment. 
2. The World of Cross-border Co-operation 
In cross-border co-operations functional orientations dominate. The territorial, administrative orientation do not 
shows the same importance as inside national states. Especially environmental linkages have always ranked among 
the most important driving forces for the inflationary rise of cross-border co-operations during the last decades. 
Such co-operative entities bridge territories and lead by their unpacking of geographical spaces in some respect to 
the reconfiguration of European ’regions’. 
2.1. Bridging National Boundaries 
In a globalized world, functional linkages steadily increase - also at the smaller, regional scale. As a con-
sequence cross-border problems and connections, geographic relations and confrontations define challenges and 
risks for regional development across national boundaries. Under such complex conditions different kinds of 
proximities are of importance structuring the environment in which regions have to compete. Therefore these 
proximities promise competitive advantages. The different kinds of proximities (spatial, cognitive, organizational, 
social, institutional) are complementary or even reinforce each other. Especially spatial proximity is seen as 
supportive factor for the other ones (Boschma, 2005). In this context regions join forces and co-operate on a 
supraregional level. By their co-operations they try to make use of these different kinds of proximities assuming that 
they give them a specific solidarity. Yet, the only definite proximity is spatial proximity as a starting point for cross-
border co-operations.  
Transnational integration and domestic decentralization/regionalization are challenging the dominance of 
national administrations in governing these supraregional co-operations. The institutionalized links between 
subnational actors and the official inclusion of subnational actors in cross-border institutions are undermining the 
exclusive gate-keeper role which national executives held during most of the twentieth century, especially in the 
field of international policy. Nevertheless, it would be too easy to release the nation state or the territorial basis of 
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politics in general (Blatter, 2004). Thus, the relevance of (administrative) borders for these developments is 
discussed intensively from different sides (Blum 2003, Kirsch 2003). Blum (2003), for example, argues that 
integration of regions is a growing and important phenomenon, but often hampered by the national frontiers “as an 
additional element of distance [...] because of their cultural, linguistic and judicial separation effects” (Blum 2003, 
p. 514). A similar argument is provided by Kirsch who emphasizes that a distinction has to be drawn between 
existing official national borders, being the result of political decisions, and nationality, reflecting historically grown 
cultural and emotional proximity (Kirsch 2003, p. 258).  
Yet, supraregional co-operations expect important benefits by overcoming these administrative boundaries - at 
least for selected issues. Thus, since the 1990ies one notes a strong raise in the number of supraregional co-
operations all over the world but especially in Western and Eastern Europe, further enforced by the European 
integration efforts. These diverse supraregional co-operative entities are built of at least two but most of the time 
significantly more regions belonging to different states and therefore to different institutional systems. These new 
entities weigh functional demarcation criteria higher than administrative or political ones. In this context three 
different types of supraregional cooperation have to be distinguished (Pfirrmann & Zumbusch, 2005):  
1. intranational co-operation between regions of the same federal or national system: This kind of co-operation 
processes often aim at coalition building with regard to the national level to gain influence and weight 
(politically, etc.) as well as at using complementarities and synergies.  
2. interregional co-operation between regions spread all over Europe which build strategic alliances for specific 
issues. Most of the time their objectives are focused on learning from each other, on benchmarking processes 
as well as on the exchange of information, and experiences.  
3. cross-border /transnational co-operation: This kind of supraregional co-operation processes takes place 
between neighboring regions or between regions of neighboring states. With this respect cross-border co-
operations may show enormous differences in scale from euregional co-operations between directly 
neighboring areas or transbordering city-regions on one side to big co-operations in a more transnational way 
on the other side. Cross-border co-operations may focus on mastering similar challenges or cross-border 
problems, on taking benefits from complementary assets, on using synergies and critical masses to improve 
their competitive advantages as well as on coordination and integration objectives or coalition building. A 
broad spectrum of funding schemes from the national as well as the European level with significant 
differences in objectives and allocation criteria is provided. 
With regard to these differences, our focus is on the cross-border type of supraregional co-operations as they are 
able - due to their (spatial) proximities - to develop certain governance structures, dealing amongst others with 
common environmental issues. Combating cross border problems with joint forces, meeting the challenge of strong 
cross border linkages as well as the expectation of beneficial synergies and complementarities together form the 
basis of cross-border co-operation processes and the rational for new regional combinations. 
2.2. The Underlying Rationale for Cross-Border Cooperation  
Cross-border regions make the well known argument visible that functionally defined spaces are not al-ways 
identical with the administratively defined spaces. A new logic of space has been developing showing a decreased 
territorial orientation. Nevertheless, tackling such functional challenges is in cross-border regions even more 
difficult than inside national states with their well defined administrative entities with formal competencies and 
responsibilities. Differences in the language often combined with institutional, cultural, legal discrepancies render 
the conditions for co-operation more complex. Even though the European integration process has already brought 
forward significant achievements, national boundaries remain important barriers. To assure the bundling of interests, 
efforts and relevant know-how for meeting cross-border objectives means hard work. Different systems and 
perceptions have to be bridged, a common base for working and communicating has to be found. Success is only 
possible if a broad range of resources and reliable (political) commitment is put forward. Cross-border activities 
have to be carried out in a voluntary and co-operative way, they require tenacity and continuity.  
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At the same time the reasons which motivate regional actors to engage in cross-border initiatives, range widely 
between rooted opportunistic behaviors and emergent strategic attitudes. This may be observed by considering the 
main objectives being addressed by cross-border initiatives (e.g. Gualini, 2003):  
• unifying capacities for problem-solving; 
• using synergies and common resources; 
• cost-benefit sharing; 
• promotion of local assets; 
• access to funding; 
• positioning and lobbying in national, international, and intergovernmental relations/competitions; 
• policy exchange and sharing of best practices. 
The balance between these factors is very much dependent on capacities of networking and coalition-building 
based on the identification or construction of common interests, and on their generalization as the mission of an 
(emergent) cross-regional policy community. Hence, a crucial dimension is the building of new cross-border 
alliances around specific issues and development initiatives. This entails important opportunities in terms of the 
potential for innovative outcomes and the development of bottom-up processes. In this context one can also 
differentiate the aspects leading to cross-border activities in (i) objective and functional aspects determining a need 
for co-operation and (ii) a certain homogeneity of preferences on the other hand.  
• The objective necessities for cross-border co-operation can be based on a common (not only com-parable) 
problem, on prevention policies based on favorable situations and an alarmist agenda setting, as well as on 
a so-called "two-level-game" of the regional decision-makers trying to use the profiling activities of one 
level (e.g. international level) to open up new possibilities on another level (e.g. national level) (Putnam, 
1988; cit by Blatter, 2001).  
• In many cases cross-border activities are (also) based on a cross-border homogeneity of preferences and 
interests which is mainly due to the influence of certain epistemic communities. These epistemic 
communities are often science based, but with intensive linkages to the regional policy world. And they can 
be extremely successful in generating cross-border pressure for actions and in covering discrepancies of 
involved interests. These kind of cross-border regime building is most of the time sectorally orientated (e.g. 
specific environmental issues).  
Regardless of the underlying specific reason, cross-border co-operations show a broad range of different 
activities which also emphasize different organizational details and understandings. Co-operations can focus on only 
one single issue or exhibit an integrative and comprehensive development approach. With respect to the specific 
sectors of the co-operations also different institutional and organizational structures are chosen. Yet, what all 
European cross-border regions have in common is the effort to implement the “idea of Europe” at the regional level. 
It would be, however, difficult to state, that this “idea” would have been pursued without public support from the 
European Commission. With the Community initiative INTERREG the European Union has successfully put 
territorial co-operation on the (regional) agendas. INTERREG with its specific funding regime has also influenced 
the thematic agenda of cross-border regions bringing up new issues which have not been on the cross-border agenda 
before. In particular, cross-border co-operations funded by INTERREG programs had to take into account possible 
implications of their activities on the horizontal objectives protection of the environment and gender mainstreaming 
(Ward &Wolleb, 2010). 
In any case, the "unbundling" of cross-border activities means complementing the single territorial policy (nation 
state) with a variety of political spaces of flows which may be of direct relevance only to specific policy dimensions, 
but have a significant mobilizing capacity and a tremendous transformational power (Blatter, 2004). 
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3. Governance in Cross-border Regions 
In nations there are usually legally structured vertical decision-making systems, where the jurisdiction of the 
individual political levels for decision-making and implementation is precisely defined. These decision-making 
systems usually do not exist for cross-border cooperation or are not "compatible" with the respective national 
decision-making systems. This means that the political levels involved may have different jurisdiction for decision 
making and implementation. In the practice of cross-border co-operation, these incompatibilities result in a 
significant increase of the complexity of those participating, and consequently to a stronger need of co-operative 
arrangements. In general, cross-border co-operations can be classified taking into account amongst others the 
following criteria: level of co-operation, issues tackled by the co-operation, actors involved, legal status of the co-
operation or organizational form.  
3.1. Cross-border Co-operations as Regional Governance Systems 
Thus, cross-border regions are even more multi-actor spaces than institutionalized regions in decentralized states. 
Without any formal competencies cross-border regions are fully depending on successful governance processes to 
co-ordinate and develop common activities. In practice, the only way to achieve joint action has always been and 
still is through agreement or consent. Thus, their activities are exclusively based on co-operative processes between 
widely self-organized systems (regions) – comparable to the core definition of “regional governance”, which 
stresses the three elements (i) self-organization, (ii) co-ordination and interaction as well as (iii) strategic 
intelligence/openness for learning. Governance therefore usually implies a `cooperative' style of interaction. It points 
to a strengthened collaboration between actors from the public, private, and non-profit sectors. This collaboration 
among various levels of the politico-administrative system and across different systems has to be based on exchange 
and negotiation among equals. For this reason, cross-border co-operations are based on vertical, horizontal, as well 
as lateral networks on one hand and a system of common values and rules on the other hand. Even if the territorial 
aspect is of less importance also cross-border governance activities show a well defined spatial reference framework 
and are always dependent on the specific context, situation, and on the specific actors involved. Each region has to 
find its own way of co-operation and good-governance, since an universally valid model of successful regional 
governance is not existing (Scherer, 2006). 
In Europe the process of regional cross-border institution-building shows the quite typical modern features of 
institutions with a dominance of public sector actors, a clear-cut geographic scale, a multi-functional scope, and 
temporal stability. New cross-border institutions do not replace national ones but complement them (Blatter, 2003). 
In consequence, co-operation based activities in cross-border regions cause a further multiplication of governance-
layers, a process which has been called `relativization of scales' (Brenner, 1999, p. 33), `multi-level governance' 
(Marks et al., 1996) or `multi-tiered system of governance' (Leibfried & Pierson, 1995; cit. after Blatter, 2004) as the 
European governance system is being complemented by another rather weak but comprehensive layer of institutions 
of governance and identity formation.  
Governance challenges of cross-border regions are aggravated amongst other factors by differing cultural, 
institutional, and legal systems, varying backgrounds, different languages as well as by a lacking knowledge about 
the different systems involved. In order to trace some of its major challenges, it is hence important to point out 
crucial prerequisites about the nature of cross-border governance (Gualini, 2003): sufficient stability, incentives for 
new forms of collective action, innovative approaches, openness, sufficient resources and capacities, effectiveness, 
sufficient autonomy and accountability.   
These latter factors converge to the issue of the democratic legitimacy of emergent cross-border governance 
settings. While overcoming borders may be viewed inherently as an act of democratization, the democratic 
legitimacy of cross-border governance faces a dual contradiction. On the one hand, the exercise of formal 
democracy is traditionally tied to the exercise of territorial sovereignty; on the other hand, the exercise of 
substantive democracy is tied to forms of socio-political commitment and identification that seem to be challenged 
in communities without borders or with blurring borders. Cross-border governance, hence, entails its own challenge 
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to democratic processes: a challenge that calls for innovative solutions while still being highly dependent on a wider 
system of institutional relationships (ibid.). 
In addition to the features mentioned above, governance processes in cross-border regions rely on some more 
essential factors: while a main group of actors with a high reputation should take over a driving role for the cross-
border processes also the continuing integration of new elites is necessary. Thus, the governance networks should be 
open for new actors and stimuli also from outside the region. In any case it should be characterized by a high 
capacity for communication and strategy-formulation in the specific thematic fields of cross-border co-operation. If 
these conditions are given, cross-border governance systems have a sustainable and reliant base. But besides these 
fundamental conditions some other aspects are of a further enforcing influence on the success of the cross-border 
governance systems (Scherer, 2006).  
• accessibility to sufficient resources and capacities; 
• capable administrative systems; 
• positive personal relations between the main actors involved; 
• shared values or shared knowledge as motivation for the main actors involved; 
• existence of ‘structural holes’; 
• existence of ‘political opportunity structures’; 
• alteration between participative and elitist approaches; 
• clear distinctions between actors of (political) power and actors of expertise; 
On the other hand there are also aspects to be taken into account which can impede successful cross-border 
governance like missing leadership in the governance process, missing capacities for the strategic supervision of the 
process, missing co-operation at the local level, a conflict-driven and competitive regional system of interaction with 
conflicting hidden agendas, political games of the main decision-makers, conservative thinking of the regional 
elites, allocation conflicts in the implementation phase or different logics of action (especially territorial orientations 
versus functional orientations). Considering this variety of risks it is quite obvious that cross-border governance has 
also to accept certain limitations which are comparable to the ones of regional governance in general. Especially due 
to its co-operative character a lack in democratic legitimization, high costs for coordination as well as a certain non-
binding quality of the decisions taken have to be considered. But also other aspects like the formation of closed 
circles and cartelization effects impose important risks. Though, altogether the main limit of cross-border co-
governance - like of regional governance in general - seems to be a limited capacity for conflict-solving.  
Due to the immanent features of governance approaches cross-border institutions have to focus on development 
functions and cannot take over regulatory policies. This given, cross-border regions will never replace traditional 
administration entities of the national states but will always be in a complementary and hopeful compatible addition 
to these. Furthermore successful governance of cross-border regions will also have to fall back on hierarchical 
competencies inside the respective national states to complete activities and make them more reliable.  
3.2. Environmental Issues in Cross-border Co-operations 
Cross-border cooperation in the field of environmental protection is a policy field at the interface of two different 
policy sectors: environmental policy with its specific sector of international environmental policy, and international 
policy with its specific sector of cross-border cooperation on the sub-national level. Both specific sectors are 
relatively new policy fields, that have received increasing attention over the last two decades. Although both policy 
fields were already discussed in politics and political science during the seventies, a substantial increase of their 
significance in political practice as well as in scientific discussion can be seen today.  
Environmental problems do not stop at national boundaries. Ecological linkages are complex and international 
(‘multiple interdependence’) (Strübel, 1992). Some linkages take place globally (e.g. climate change), others 
regionally (e.g. pollution of the lake Constance), others even locally (e.g. waste dump). Problems arise mainly from 
the fact that costs and benefits of environmental problems as well as of environmental protection are unevenly 
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distributed and cause symmetric or asymmetric constellations (see also chapter 5.1). Therefore different types of 
environmental linkages require solutions in different political arenas (Scherer, 1997). In general the scale of the 
environmental linkages corresponds well with the appropriate political level - if there is one. In consequence the 
problem of cross-border environmental problems is that there is often no corresponding political arena responsible 
for this kind of problem. These arenas have to find together and become institutionalized in the first place.  
Regional and thereby cross-border environmental policies are for the most part very close to environ-mentally 
relevant problems. Examples for co-operations are: environmental linkages and problems, economic linkages 
causing environmental challenges, social linkages with different perceptions for example of environmentally 
relevant issues, the wish for higher efficiency and effectiveness of environmentally relevant activities or the pressure 
for co-operation due to common problems. The difference to general cross-border cooperation lies in the 
substantially higher degree of complexity especially with respect to the participating partners. This higher degree of 
complexity arises from the fact that environmental policy per se is an interdisciplinary policy field touching upon 
various issues of other policy fields. Consequently various political levels and policy fields get involved in solving 
cross-border environmental problems. In addition, environmental policy is organized quite differently in different 
states, competencies are unequally allocated on different levels and at different entities. Cross-border environmental 
policy is thus characterized by a very high degree of complexity and at the same time by concurrent lacks of 
hierarchical decision-making systems. These difficult conditions are further aggravated as environmental topics are 
in large parts likely to cause conflicts. With regard to these difficult conditions for cross-border environmental 
governance the success of some European cross-border regions in the field, e.g. the Lake Constance region, is quite 
astonishing.  
4. The Lake Constance-Region 
With 49.4 bio m3 water and a surface of 539 km2 the Lake Constance is one of the largest lakes of the whole of 
Europe. Besides its ecological value especially its function as potable water reservoir for more than 6 Mio. people in 
the nearby regions is of importance. Its catchment-area is encompassing areas of four different national states, ten 
different regions and 528 different communities and is quite complex and divers.   
4.1. A first glance at the diversity of the Lake Constance region 
Since the beginning of the 21st century the cross border area of activities 'Regio-Bodensee' has been established. 
This region is politically defined and composed of 14 different regions of the four different states Austria, Germany, 
Liechtenstein, and Switzerland. In the year 2000 more than 3.5 mio. people were living in this region. Thus, the 
density of population is relatively high. There is no specific centre of the region, moreover the region is 
characterized by a polycentric structure - even though the canton Zurich and herewith the agglomeration Zurich is 
also assigned as part of the Regio Bodensee since 1998. 
Under federal aspects the region is a very heterogeneous construct. With Liechtenstein a sovereign national state 
is involved. On the Austrian and the Swiss side of the Lake the specific subnational levels with their specific 
competencies are participating (Land Vorarlberg and six Swiss cantons). Hence on the German side there are is only 
the communal level (six so called Landkreise) integrated that means only parts of the two regions Baden-
Württemberg and Bavaria. In consequence estimations see more than 5'000 regional politicians in the region. 
Also in an economic point of view the region is quite diverse with a conglomerate of differently oriented areas of 
activities (St. Gallen, Konstanz, Bregenz, Lindau, etc.) showing only few relations and dependencies. Also sectoral 
orientations differ significantly on the different sides of the lake. Only the importance of tourism is similar. So 
altogether the lake Constance serves as area for recreation and holidays for more than 10 mio. people each year. On 
the other hand the lake Constance region shows some important constancies: so it has a homogenous landscape in 
which people with the same cultural roots are living speaking (almost) the same language (Scherer/ Schnell, 2002). 
The Lake Constance and the Rhine have always constituted important natural barriers in this scene. This kind of 
natural boundary is not only separating but also connecting as the separative element water is on the same time an 
important contact-zone (e.g. Ratti, 1996). However, even though the lake has always been seen as a common good, 
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this common good did not help to generate a common identity in the regions around. So in some senses the lake has 
always constituted a barrier, in other senses it build a base for common orientations and first co-operative efforts.  
Figure 1: The politically defined region of the Lake Constance (Source: Scherer & Schnell, 2002, p.2.)
All in all the lake Constance has always been used in manifold ways and has had to fulfill quite divers functions. 
In this regard especially its important role as habitat, as reservoir for potable water, and its importance as area for 
recreation have to be mentioned. Between these dominating utilizations a certain competition has to be taken into 
account (Scherer, 1997). The motorized shipping sport is a good example for the diverse interests clashing: For 
some classes of people this way of shipping is an important element of their individual recreation and leisure time. 
At the same time it is responsible for pollution of the important potable water reservoir, for disturbances of flora and 
fauna habitats by noise, wave effects, and harbor facilities (e.g. Blatter, 2001).  
4.2. A Long History and Broad Variety of Cross-border Co-operations 
The region around the lake Constance has a long tradition in cross-border co-operation. Hence, traditionally the 
co-operation was characterized by a high degree of informality and by a quite selective focus on only a few groups 
of actors. More formal and institutionalized ways of co-operating are quite new for the region. All in all, cross-
border co-operations began in the second half of the nineteenth century and show different phases of development 
(e.g. Scherer & Schnell, 2007): 
4.2.1. The phase of formation (1850-1918)  
The first phase of cross-border co-operation is mainly due to the consequences of industrialization. With the help 
of steam-boats trade-relations over the lake were intensified. Shipping on the lake had to be regulated. Already in 
the year 1824 cross-border liner traffic had started. But coordination of the lines the schedules, and the prices had 
not been made until the year 1884. This first coordination is still valid. Even today's schedule and plan of the ferry 
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boats is mainly based on these first coordination results. At the same time also the railways became more common, 
and tourism in the lake Constance region started to intensify. In consequence the international traffic association was 
founded of 74 different communities. But even in other fields co-operation efforts started to become more formal. 
So in the year 1857 the treaty between the Grossherzogtum Baden, the kingdom of Württemberg and Bavaria, the 
empire Austria-Hungary, and the Swiss confederation was signed for regulating the outflow of the lake. The same 
partners plus Liechtenstein also signed an agreement concerning fishery in the Lake Constance - an important base 
for the International Conference for Fishing at the lake Constance (IBKF) which is still in work. Also other 
coordinative organizations e.g. of the firefighters, the electricity suppliers, the sailors, the officers or others were 
founded during these years. The first political cross-border organization, the Socialist Lake Constance 
Internationale, took up its work in 1905. With the beginning of World War I all cooperative efforts stopped, and 
were suppressed till after World War II. 
4.2.2. The phase of environment (1955-1975)  
The next development in cross-border co-operation took place when severe conflicts between economic growth 
and protection of the environment in general and especially of the potable water had to be set on the policy agenda. 
The pollution of the lake Constance was massive - the lake was in danger to collapse. At the same time some 
projects of large scale (navigability of the Upper-Rhine, a bridge between Meersburg and Constance, the ENI-
pipeline between Geneve and Ingolstadt, etc.) brought about new cross-border coalitions. New cross-border 
discourses and regulations (e.g. the agreement for protection of the Lake Constance against pollution 1960) were 
made possible and new cross-border institutions were founded like the International Commission for Water 
Protection of the Lake Constance (IGKB) in the year 1959 which is still working and of great importance for the 
region. Also the Working Committee of the Water Supply Companies Lake Constance and Rhine (1968) helped to 
impede the above mentioned large-scale projects. Furthermore the International Working Committee for Protection 
of Nature and Landscape (1961) as well as the Working Committee Natural Protection Lake Constance (ANB, 
1971) are to be mentioned. In this environmentally determined phase of cross border co-operation in the lake 
Constance region also first technical infrastructures (e.g. a common sewage purification plant of the German cities 
Singen and Gottmadingen and the Swiss Stein am Rhein) were built bridging national boundaries. 
4.2.3. The phase of planning (1970-1990) 
The first European Conference of the Spatial Planning Ministers (1970) claimed cross-border spatial planning 
commissions for European cross-border regions. In the Lake Constance region this claim caused substantial 
discussions about the manning of this new policy arena. Especially local representatives on one hand and 
representatives of the national administration on the other hand were competing. This rivalry gave rise to the main 
bodies of today's co-operation. A local initiative (Euregio Bodensee) was contrasted by the foundation of a 
Conference with more than 100 national political representatives of all regions (Länder in Germany and Austria as 
well as Swiss cantons) involved in the Lake Constance region. In the beginning its meetings were quite random, it 
was not until 1979 that this Conference - then called International Conference of the Lake Constance (IBK) - took 
up a continuous and more intense work focusing initially on the protection of environment and water. This 
conference is still serving as the main platform and an umbrella organization for cross-border co-operation in the 
region. In addition an Austrian-German as well as a German-Swiss spatial planning commission were founded, both 
based on a formal treaty between the corresponding national states and with experts assigned. The territorial 
perspective and the multisectoral approach of these institutions were determining the cross-border co-operations of 
the following years. Especially the international concept for the Lake Constance region ("Internationales Leitbild für 
das Bodenseegebiet") was of importance as it was the first time that a cross-border region had common guide lines 
for the development of its space, its economy and its environment - even if its concrete impacts were controversially 
discussed (Blatter & Scherer, 2006). 
4.2.4. The phase of awakening (1990-2000) 
In the wake of the international policy (Single European Market, fall of the iron curtain, etc.) cross-border co-
operation in the Lake Constance region was also setting out in an European direction. Correspondingly an 
intensification of co-operative activities as well as the foundation of new cross-border institutions was to be 
observed. Public discussions were mainly focused on the concern that a new positioning of the lake Constance was 
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seen as essential. In the year 1991 the Council of the Lake Constance region was found - meant to complement the 
national initiative IBK with a kind of citizen's initiative. This foundation brought a new momentum to the cross-
border co-operation. The IBK intensified its work and assigned new working groups (economy, education/science 
and research, etc.). In addition also the Council of Environment was established. Due to the European Community 
initiative for territorial co-operation (INTERREG-program) financial resources were allocated to cross-border 
projects and brought a new momentum. In the framework of INTERREG and INTERREG-II altogether more than 
140 projects were funded with more than 25 mio EUR.  
4.2.5. The phase of networking (2000-) 
Due to the INTERREG-III program for the Lake Constance regions and the so called Agenda 21 for the Lake 
Constance region, which was initiated by the IBK and aimed to set sustainability on the regional agenda especially 
in the fields of economy, traffic, spatial development and youth, the profile of cross-border activities changed. New 
actors have been stimulated and integrated in cross-border efforts, the predominance of the administrative sector has 
been reduced. So far mainly politically orientated structures opened up and new areas of co-operation and 
corresponding representatives of the economy or the civil society became more integrated. In consequence this 
phase of cross-border co-operation was characterized on one hand by the development of new cross-border networks 
which were mainly informally and not institutionalized, and on the other hand by a policy of precise and tangible 
projects bringing about fast and well visible added values. Besides, the established cross-border structures were 
further institutionalized as the programming and delivery of INTERREG programs required specific cross border 
organizations.  
A good overview over the tradition of cross-border co-operation in the lake Constance region is also given by 
Müller-Schnegg (1994) as well as by Müller et al. (1994). Currently there are already more than 400 cross-border 
organizations to be found in the Lake Constance region.  
4.3. The Current Cross-border Structure as Regional Governance System 
Cross-border co-operations in the Lake Constance region have primarily been resulting out of the common use of 
the common good "Lake Constance" as well as out of the necessity to coordinate for avoiding overexploitation. In 
the past these co-operations were determined by little institutionalized, network based structures strongly dominated 
by the administration sector (Scherer & Schnell, 2002). Those institutions which were created in the first wave of 
cross-border regionalism at the end of the 1960ies have been continually working and had already established 
capacity and trust when the second wave of cross-border regionalism hit the region in the seventies and eighties.  
In the last decade these networks were opened (especially by the Agenda 21 and the INTERREG programs) and 
additional actors of the economy, of the regional civil society as well as of the local level were integrated. And the 
financial resources provided by the INTERREG initiative of the European Union did not only stimulate a broader 
array of regional actors from all sectors to participate in cross-border activities but made it also possible for the 
major cross-border institutions to become more formalized, getting their own staff and budget - a precondition for 
continuous work and policy production (Blatter, 2004). So even if the most important institutions (IBK, etc.) are still 
purely intergovernmental and complemented by institutionalized meetings of legislators, others like the Border 
Environmental Cooperation Commission cooperate intensively with private actors for specific projects. 
Also if one regards the functional scope of cross-border activities, nowadays encompassing programs and 
activities in many policy fields are to be found. The IBK widened its scope of activities in the nineties from mainly 
water-oriented policies towards economic and cultural activities. With the help of the INTERREG-programs the 
policy scope in the Lake Constance region has been steadily expanded to include currently almost all possible policy 
fields and all kinds of projects (Blatter, 2004). Herewith the development of the cross-border systems corresponds 
almost perfectly the ideal of the from Fürst (2001) declared change of paradigm in regional science: from 
government of regions to regional governance. Thus, in the current structure cross border co-operation of the lake 
Constance region corresponds to the understanding of a regional governance system characterized by a high degree 
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of horizontal, vertical and lateral networking, by a common set of values and standards - at least in some fields - as 
well as by co-operative actions (Scherer, 2006, p. 94).  
As cross-border co-operation in the lake Constance region is still only formalized and institutionalized to a very 
small degree and characterized instead by a high degree of informality and network-relations, cross-border co-
operation only works successfully if common objectives exist. Compounding base of all these network based 
activities has been the existence of guiding development principles, in which a common understanding -
independent from its explicit or implicit formulation - about the future development of the cross-border region was 
defined (Scherer & Schnell, 2002).  
Figure 2: The comprehensive regional governance system (Source: Scherer & Schnell, 2002) 
In the Lake Constance region the INTERREG programs as well as the Agenda 21 played a guiding role in the set 
of cross-border networks as (cross-border) activities of the last years were strongly orientated on their development 
directions. The Agenda 21 of the Lake Constance with its sustainability issues could make use of a kind of structural 
hole as the political arena of the euregio had not been constituted by specific actors and their objectives. New issues 
like the issue of sustainability could therefore be set on the agenda without to much competition. The INTERREG 
program on the other side acted as a political opportunity structure, under its shield issues could be placed with the 
resources needed. These two aspects, structural holes and political opportunity structures, are also crucial for the 
development of regional governance systems (Scherer, 2006, p. 247).  
4.4. The Role of Environment in the Lake Constance Region 
The development of cross-border activities in the lake Constance region as presented above were strongly 
influenced by environmental issues. Especially in the dawn of cross-border co-operation processes environmental 
problems have ranked among the most important driving forces. In the complex and divers conditions of the cross-
border region imperative environmental problems have often served as unifying element, putting diverging forces to 
the background.  
So the cross-border co-operations in the lake Constance region had almost exclusively been concentrated on 
environmental issues linked to the water quality and to the common utilization of the lake. This narrow focus on 
regulating the utilization of the lake as common good has been enlarged in the mid nineties as the International 
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of the lake. Therefore the IGKB has been following a systemic and in consequence more integrative understanding. 
That means that the environmental issues have been complemented for example by agricultural or spatial planning 
issues. So in the end cross border co-operations have dealt with environmental questions as an integral part of the 
regional development especially of its spatial development. That means that environmental issues are still subject to 
a broad variety of specific cross-border coalitions (International Water Conservation Commission, the regional 
environment Council, the working group of the regional water suppliers, etc.). But at the same time they are on the 
agenda of the cross-border umbrella organizations with a strong administrative and legislative background, 
benefiting of a strong (political) commitment.  
Nevertheless, despite all of these different cross-border institutions concrete activities in the field of spatial, 
traffic, or landscape planning have been limited to a small number in only some parts of the region like the Rhine 
valley or the co-operation area Lake Constance-Oberschwaben or the dipole Sin-gen-Schaffhausen (Seifert 2008). It 
seems that the creeping loss of scenic qualities due to continuous suburbanizing and the bad infrastructural 
connection of the region to the European net of high speed trains exerts a significantly smaller pressure to local 
actors to co-operate as the just in time averted limnological collapse.  
5. Cross-Border Governance Options to Handle Conflicts
As we have seen, imperative environmental problems have often served as unifying element enforcing cross-
border co-operations, putting diverging forces to the background. But just as often environmental issues fell from 
the agenda when the most important problems seemed to be solved or eased - as these issues are too likely to cause 
severe conflicts between the partners. This points out to one of the main problems of cross-border governance, 
which is also to be felt in the Lake Constance region: similar to general regional governance developments (and 
network structures) also cross-border governance systems show limited possibilities to handle severe conflicts 
between participating actors.  
To solve conflicts co-operation based systems have often to fall back on traditional approaches like hierarchical 
or market solutions (Powell, 1996). Thus, if regional governance systems of one single state are concerned, an issue-
specific combination of governance approaches with hierarchical government activities may overcome a conflicted 
based impasse. This kind of conflict-solving in the shadow of hierarchy has not to be negatively judged. Regional 
governance and government are not conflicting, but moreover one another reinforcing, supporting, and 
complementing approaches (e.g. Scharpf, 1993, p. 67; Stoker, 1998, p. 17). But in contrast to the situation, when 
intrastate issues are addressed, there are no hierarchical decision-making structures in cross-border regions. Hence, 
the conflict-solving process must be considered as extremely difficult. 
In consequence many cross-border governance systems - like in the Lake Constance region - can be classified as 
"fair-weather"-policies. That means that cross-border institutions deal almost exclusively with issues which are not 
likely to cause severe conflicts between the cooperative partners (Scherer & Schnell, 2002). Hence, hot issues which 
are known to be discussed quite diversely, like the problems around the Zurich airport or the (planned) radioactive 
repository in the Swiss village of Benken, have so far not been addressed by the main cross-border institutions in the 
Lake Constance Region. At the same time this does not mean, that these co-operations cannot deal with cross-border 
problems, as not every cross-border problem has to result in a cross-border conflict. So all in all, three different 
strategies seem advisable for handling problems which may cause severe conflicts in cross-border co-operations:  
• the avoidance of conflicts by coordinated legally binding regulations in each national state involved or by a 
politically legitimated umbrella organization with strategic and formal competencies in the specific field,  
• the handling of conflicts by changing the political arena in the framework of the cross-border co-operation 
horizontally or vertically,  
• the solving of conflicts by changing the cross-border cost-benefit ratio in the Caldor-Criterion by 
compensatory payments or by package deals. 
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In consequence, the capacities of cross-border governance systems to successfully solve cross-border 
(environmental) problems are strongly dependent on (i) the specific constellation of the concerned partners (see 
chapter 5.1) as well as on (ii) the allocation of benefits and detriments resulting of the underlying problem induced 
by the specific constellation of the partners (see chapter 5.2).  
5.1. Constellations of Environmental Problems in Cross-border Regions 
A thorough analysis of problematical environmental situations with regard to the symmetries or asymmetries 
between the involved partners is essential: environmental conflicts seem solvable if there is a high degree of 
symmetry in the interests, in the benefits /detriments of possible solutions, in the competencies, etc. between the 
partners. On the contrary asymmetric relations are claiming a high degree of problem-solving capacities and an 
intensive co-operation. In such cases the probability to find a resilient and sustainable common solution is quite low 
(Scherer, 1997). In this context especially the specific constellation of benefits and detriments of the underlying 
environmental conflict is of great importance and has to be changed - if possible - to get an agreement.  
5.1.1. Symmetric Problem-Constellation "Common Good" with common problems 
The constellation "common good" is characterized by symmetrical benefit-detriments relations as all partner 
regions are dependent on the utilization of the common good. As all partner show the same dependency they are all 
affected by possible problems. Problems concerning the common good are in consequence also common problems 
and of importance for all partners. This situation can significantly simplify cross-border cooperation. But since there 
are very diffuse and multiple relationships between causers and those affected in the case of common-good 
problems, a danger is given that one of the sub-regions benefits from the efforts of the others as a "free-rider". Such 
free-rider partners do not have any detriments or costs themselves but may benefit from the efforts of the other 
regions - at least for a while. 
Figure 3: Symmetric Problem-Constellation “Common Good” (Source: own illustration according to Scherer, 2010) 
5.1.2. Symmetric Problem-Constellation "Neighbors" with the same problems 
Also in this constellation of for example two regions each bordering the same river the benefit-detriment relations 
are symmetric, so that the problem-solving capacity of cross-border co-operations is high. However, there are clear 
differences between the constellation "Neighbor" and the constellation "common-good" with respect to the 
structures of interests of the sub-regions involved. While the danger of sub-regions taking "free-rides" exists in the 
case of common-good constellations with their diffuse relationships, this problem does not exist for the constellation 
"Neighbor". In this constellation the regions involved share the same problems but usually no common problems, so 




114  Roland Scherer and Kristina Zumbusch. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 14 (2011) 101–120
Figure 4: Symmetric Problem-Constellation “Neighbour” (Source: own illustration according to Scherer, 2010) 
5.1.3. Problem-Constellation "One-way" with unilateral problems 
The constellation of unilateral problems presents a clear asymmetry of benefit-detriment relations among the 
different partner regions, like it is for example the case between upstream and downstream riparian regions. That 
means that one region is strongly dependent on the activities or non-activities of the other one which is completely 
independent. Solving such a problem would mean that one of the sub-regions has to take over all detriments and 
costs (while the other sub-region enjoys the benefits). Because the detriments and benefits are unequally distributed, 
cross-border cooperation is made more difficult in these constellations. In the case of these one-way burdens there is 
an intrinsic danger that cross-border conflicts come up that cannot be solved due to a lack of problem-solving 
capacities. In cross-border environmental policies such kind of environmental burdens with strongly asymmetrical 
cost-benefit relationships have usually not been dealt with.  
Figure 5: Asymmetric Problem-Constellation “One-Way” (Source: own illustration according to Scherer, 2010) 
5.2. Strategies for Solving Conflicts in Cross-border Co-operations 
The different constellations of cross-border problems underline that not every cross-border problem has to 
imperatively cause a cross-border conflict. In particular for problems of the "Common Good" constellation a 
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generally result in deep cross-border conflicts which cannot be solved by the usual processes of the existing cross-
border governance structures. The reason for this is to be found in the allocation of benefits and detriments induced 
by the specific problem-constellation. Successful conflict-solving in the framework of a cross-border governance 
system is only possible if the asymmetric constellations of benefits and detriments linked to the specific 
constellation of the problem can be changed to symmetric ones.  
Figure 6: The Pareto- and the Caldor-Criteria for conflict solving in cross-border co-operations (Source: own illustration according to Scharpf, 
1992) 
With the help of the game theory different alternatives of the problem-solving process with regard to the 
constellation of benefits and detriments can be checked. In general, there are two competing formula to assess the 
allocation of benefits and detriments (Scharpf, 1992):  (i) the individualistic Pareto-Criterion saying that nobody 
shall be put in worse conditions than the Status-Quo and at least one in better conditions; (ii) the utilitarian Caldor-
Criterion saying that such solutions and measures are acceptable that augment the net sum of total benefits. That 
means benefits of one actor have at least to overweigh possible detriments of others.  
Figure 7: Compensatory Payments and Package Deals (Source: own illustration 2010) 
If both partners, for example actor X and actor Y, benefit from an approach (sector I, Fig. 6) - even if the full 
amount of the specific benefits differs - the solution would fall under the Pareto-Criterion, would not cause any 
conflict and would be accepted. In environmental cross-border conflicts the Pareto-Criterion can hardly ever be 
reached - with the exception of the "common-good" constellations. But also if both partners get detriments (sector 
III, Fig. 6) the solution is not causing any diverging interests between the involved partners, but will never be 
realized.  
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The majority of environmental decisions reallocates conditions, and brings about unilateral detriments. Since 
cross-border environmental policies are not able to abandon these issues completely, a change is required from an 
individualistic assessment-approach to an utilitarian one. With reference to the Caldor-Criterion decisions of 
environmental governance in cross-border regions are justifiable whenever the sum of the achieved benefits would 
be enough to compensate the losers. So especially such problems require comprehensive solutions which cause 
asymmetric detriments and benefits (e.g. in particular constellation “One Way”) (sector II, Fig. 6). In these cases it 
is indispensable that (i) the benefits generated prevail the detriments caused (Caldor) and that (ii) in consequence the 
asymmetric allocation of benefits and detriments is changed to a symmetric one - otherwise their realization is also 
quite unlikely (with the exception of negative package deals). 
Two different strategies are able to change the asymmetric balance of benefits and detriments (see Figure 7): (i) 
Package-deals use combinations of single solutions with asymmetric benefits and focus on a symmetric net sum of 
the different benefits induced. (ii) On the other hand, achieved benefits generated by a certain solution can also be 
used to compensate other partners for potential detriments (compensatory payments). Both strategies are confronted 
with the same problem: how can negative as well as positive effects and potential impacts of problems be assessed 
and quantified?    
6. Consequences for Cross-Border (Environmental) Governance 
Imperative environmental problems have often served as unifying element, putting diverging forces to the 
background. But just as often environmental issues fell from the agenda when the most important problems seemed 
to be solved or eased - as these issues are too likely to cause severe conflicts between the partners. Furthermore 
cross-border environmental coalitions are often bypassed via much vaster relays at national level. Or they have 
difficulties in establishing effective trans-boundary institutions capable of providing democratic voice to their 
inhabitants vis-à-vis higher levels of decision-making powers. With regard to these difficulties of cross-border co-
operations in the environmental field, it is amazing how "successful" co-operations actually are in the Lake 
Constance region.  
6.1. Experiences in the Lake Constance Region 
In practice cross-border co-operation in the Lake Constance region is dominated by mixed constellations of 
conflicts. But in general the Lake Constance region has had the advantage that its cross-border co-operation is based 
on a "common-good" understanding. This "common-good" understanding is rooted in the past, on the symbolic 
value of the water for the whole region, and does not fully correspond to objective criteria. For example, the 
dependency on the potable water from the lake is completely unequal as the Swiss partners use other sources for 
their potable water. Also the river Rhine, flowing into the Lake and out of it, entails asymmetric dependencies. 
However, the subjective feeling to have common problems and a common concernment have significantly helped to 
reduce first barriers for cross-border co-operations. After the first steps had been undertaken, the success of the co-
operative efforts to prevent the Lake from a limnological collapse induced further cross-border efforts.  
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These subsequent efforts were mainly based on sectoral approaches, but all focused in a way on the water issue. 
In various fields amazing agreements could be concluded partially even in a prospective manner (common 
regulation for motorboats on the lake, etc.). Some dissonances caused a certain break in the cross-border activities 
for environmental issues. But with the IGKB environmental issues came back onto the cross-border agenda, 
although with a completely new approach. The IGKB is following a strong systemic understanding. In consequence 
environmental objectives are always integrally addressed, embedded in their systemic environment and with their 
linkages to other policy fields. This integrative activities have been complemented by new cross-border issues and 
actors coming up in the framework of the INTERREG funding and the Agenda 21 of the Lake Constance region.  
So, currently environmental issues are still on the agenda and an integral part of the cross-border governance 
system. But a stronger selection can be noticed: the number of issues which are not taken up by the co-operative 
cross-border approaches increases (e.g. the Zurich airport). At present the conflicts of air traffic noise, of harbor 
facilities, genetic engineering for agriculture or the Unesco World Cultural heritage can be mentioned with quite 
diverse characteristics. In general the experiences of the long tradition of co-operation show that conflicts of 
interests have in a first step always to be made processable. In particular, translators are needed bridging the worlds 
of different understandings, perceptions and governance approaches. In a second step the strategies of handling or 
even solving conflicts can be discussed.  
6.1.1. Example: Avoidance of Conflicts by Strategic and Binding Regulations 
In the Lake Constance Region gravel quarrying has always been an issue of conflicting cross-border interests. 
The main reserves are to be found on the German side of the lake, but the main markets are in Switzerland. In 
consequence more than 200 trucks each day passed the border from Germany to Switzerland and caused broad 
negative effects and protests. To deal with these problems the German-Swiss Commission for Spatial Planning 
(today called ROK-B) was founded. This Commission disposed of legally binding competencies due to a 
corresponding treaty of Germany and Switzerland. The Commission passed a common concept for securing the 
supply of raw materials in the region on one hand and a traffic concept on the other hand. The problem of gravel 
quarrying was not seen in an isolated way but was integrated in the general question of (cross-border) regional 
development. Herewith the legally binding concepts had to be considered in the regional development policies and 
plans of all the legislative levels involved on the German as well as on the Swiss side of the lake. Therewith the 
basic problem of asymmetric interests linked to the gravel quarrying was not solved, there are still tons of gravel 
transported to Switzerland - but it is done differently and in a more sustainable way (e.g. rail cargo, etc.). In 
consequence the situation does not result in a severe cross-border conflict. Potential conflicts arising of the situation 
are avoided by legally binding regulations of the underlying issue.     
6.1.2. Example: Handling of Conflicts by Changing the Arena 
A successful example for handling of a concrete conflict focuses once more on the water quality of the lake, 
specifically on the strict regulation of motorboats. As already mentioned above, the Lake Constance serves as an 
important reservoir of drinking water and as a tourist destination—functions that are especially important for the 
German side of the lake. In consequence, the cooperation of all littoral states to secure the water quality of the lake 
is one of the earliest international environmental conservation regimes.  
As described in chapter 4.2 the German Länder Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, the Republic of Austria, the 
Swiss Confederation and the Swiss Cantons of St. Gall and Thurgau signed an international agreement on water 
conservation and established a joint commission, the International Water Conservation Commission for Lake 
Constance (Internationale Gewässerschutzkommission für den Bodensee—IGKB) in 1960. But it was not only one 
of the first, but also one of the most successful international environmental regimes managing the development from 
a potential limnological collapse of the lake to high quality table water (Blatter, 2009). In this context, the systemic 
approach of the IGKB has to be considered. The IGKB introduced an integrative approach to cross-border water 
governance in 1987, requiring that the entire range of factors, which influence the Lake Constance ecosystem is 
taken into account. Strict regulations concerned (i) agriculture in the catchment area for reducing the pesticide levels 
in the lake, (ii) new (harbor) facilities on the shoreline, and (iii) the renaturalization of certain sectors of the 
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shoreline. But even if a broad range of integrative activities in the field were set, in comparison the common 
regulation of motorboats on the lake can be classified as a very strict regulatory policy. By 1973, two-cylinder 
motors over ten horsepower were banned for reasons of water conservation. Although this measure was early and 
unique, it was not particularly consequential. But in 1991, strict emissions standards for new motorboats were 
negotiated. At the time, these standards were unique in the Europe and were heavily contested by the motorboat 
users and boat builders of Lake Constance (ibid.). 
Amazingly these strict standards could be jointly decided even though a strong problem pressure - considerable 
evidence existed that the situation was not as problematic in terms of environmental harm - and transboundary 
interdependencies were missing at that time. Instead, the allocation of user and conservation interests in the littoral 
states revealed considerable asymmetry: On the one hand, user interests (esp. motorboat producer) were stronger in 
Switzerland than in the other countries. On the other hand, the dependency on a high water quality (drinking water) 
and therefore conservation interests were much stronger on the German side of the lake. But state executives 
strategically used their "gate-keeper" position between domestic and international politics to break domestic 
resistance (boating lobby). Representatives of water conservation authorities allied themselves in the framework of 
the IGKB - based on the important symbolic value of water for the entire cross-border region. This symbolic value 
of water was and is not only representing and constituting socio-political identities and polity relationships, but can 
also be seen as important factor for ensuring the subjective perception of a "common good constellation" with regard 
to problems concerning the lake Constance (Blatter, 2009).  
So the first barriers for negotiating strict regulations for motorboats on the lake were overcome and a common 
policy-will ensured, but then another problem appeared: the responsible institution for this kind of issue was the 
International Shipping Association of the Lake Constance which was based on a Treaty between the littoral states. In 
the framework of this Association the federal Swiss partners were not able to sign as herewith this strict regulation 
would have been binding for all lakes of Switzerland. In consequence the arena was changed: the issue was 
transferred on the agenda of the International Association of the Lake Constance's Harbor Facilities which was 
constituted by regional (cantonal) representatives. So although this institutional body showed for about 80% the 
same partners as the former one, in this constellation the partners had different statutory obligations.  
All in all the mobilization of strong alliances (e.g. epistemic communities) combined with the suitable arena for 
defining binding regulations paved the way for the strict regulations for motorboats on the Lake Constance - even 
though a strong problem pressure on one hand and symmetric interests between the littoral states on the other hand 
were missing. This can be classified as important success not only for the cross-border region of the lake Constance 
itself. The regulations stimulated similar regulations in the Swiss Confederation and the European Union.  
6.1.3. Example: Solving of Conflicts (Compensatory Payments and Package Deals) 
Solving of existing conflicts in the cross-border region of the Lake Constance is even more complex. Successful 
examples are still difficult to find, even though some important efforts have already been undertaken. As one of 
these examples focusing on compensatory payments the railway connection between Zurich and Munich can be 
mentioned. This connection has to cross Austrian territory and to pass the Rhine by an old and narrow bridge at St. 
Margrethen. The modernization of this railway connection and especially its electrification is of strong interest for 
Switzerland and also for Bavaria. But on the national level of Germany this connection is not of a high priority as it 
does not correspond to a TEN corridor. This asymmetry is further aggravated by the fact that this railway bridge is 
subject to a treaty of the year 1880. This treaty is regulating that Austria has to bear all expenses linked to this 
bridge. But the Austrian interest is low as this small railway section is not of importance for the Austrian railway 
system.  
As the Swiss side would have the greatest benefit but the lowest costs, the Swiss partners agreed to prefinance all 
costs arising out of the electrification of this railway connection between Zurich to Munich, also for the sections 
outside Switzerland on German and Austrian territory (about 50 mio. EUR). But this kind of compensatory payment 
is still restrained by the shadows of history: The binational treaty of 1880 concerning the bridge and its building 
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costs is still valid, and is impeding such kind of cooperative solutions today. So a new treaty is required. But such 
treaties are subject to the jurisdiction of the Departments for Foreign Affairs. Discussions over new treaties usually 
cover periods of about 10 to 15 years. So all involved partners have agreed upon a common solution including 
compensatory payments, but nevertheless they have to wait.  
Currently also some package deals to solve cross-border conflicts are put up for discussion. One proposition is 
focusing on a combination of the problems around the Zurich airport and its aircraft noise on one hand with the 
upgrade of the rail cargo connection Basel to Stuttgart (Gäubahn) on the other hand. That means that Swiss partners 
propose that if the Germans reconcile the differences with regard to the Zurich airport, the Swiss will pre-finance a 
part of the investment for upgrading the rail cargo connection between Basel and Stuttgart. Another Swiss 
proposition aiming at a kind of package deal is that the German agreement to the Zurich airport could be combined 
with the Swiss agreement to the double taxation Germany-Switzerland. But so far, these kind of propositions have 
been strictly rejected by the German partners.  
6.2. Potential Outlook for the Lake Constance Region 
Taking into account the problems of lacking conflict-solving capacities in cross-border co-operations, certain 
adaptations and consequences for the governance systems of the Lake Constance region are recommended. 
• The International Conference of the Lake Constance region (IBK) shall keep on to act as a political and 
strategic umbrella organization for all the divers cross-border activities taking place. At the same time the 
development principles for the region (Leitbild) should be adapted and complemented by a concerted list of 
concrete measures which will be undertaken in the coming years. Furthermore the IBK will have to assure 
that a certain openness is given to strategic co-operation on one hand and the integration of new actors as 
well as new issues on the other hand.  
• Spatial planning and concepts concerning the spatial development in the littoral regions show important 
interfaces. Therefore a stronger coordination of these concepts and spatial structures will be needed in the 
coming years. In this context also conflicts and contradictory objectives and strategies have to be explicitly 
addressed.  
In addition, it will also be of interest, what kind of impact the new paradigm of the European Structural Funds 
and herewith also of the INTERREG programs will have on the cross-border co-operation in the Lake Constance 
region. The narrow focus on the Lisbon objectives caused a strong concentration on innovation related issues. As we 
have seen in the last years, the European funding can be an important facilitator for cross border cooperation but has 
to be complemented by a number of other factors if enduring und reliable cooperation shall be achieved (certain 
degree of institutional depth, social capital, etc.). So the cross-border governance system in the Lake Constance 
region will continue to change. Its impact on environmental issues remains to be seen. 
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